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Abstract—The paper describes a new RNS (residue number
system) modular multiplication algorithm, for finite field arith-
metic over FP , based on a reduced number of moduli in base
extensions with only 3n/2moduli instead of 2n for standard ones.
Our algorithm reduces both the number of elementary modular
multiplications (EMMs) and the number of stored precomputations
for large asymmetric cryptographic applications such as elliptic
curve cryptography or Diffie-Hellman (DH) cryptosystem. It
leads to faster operations and smaller circuits.
I. INTRODUCTION
High-performance arithmetic is required in asymmetric
cryptographic applications such as RSA [1], elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) [2], [3] and discrete logarithm (DL) [4]
with Diffie-Hellman [5] and Elgamal [6] cryptosystems. In
these applications, operands range from a few hundred bits
(160–550 in ECC) to a few thousand bits (1024–8192 in RSA
and DL). Hence, reducing the computation time and silicon
area is a major concern for hardware embedded systems.
The residue number system (RNS, [7], [8]) may be seen as a
consequence of the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) where
large integers are represented by their remainders modulo
small integers. There is no carry propagation between moduli,
thus, some computations can be performed over all moduli in
parallel or in random order [9]. An RNS base B consists of
n moduli of w bits. RNS is increasingly used in asymmetric
cryptographic research, see Tab. I. Typical numbers of moduli
n range from a few moduli (for small ECC) to several dozens
(for large RSA or DL).
Modular multiplication is the most costly frequent operation
in cryptographic applications. In this paper, we propose a
new RNS modular multiplication algorithm over FP with
a reduced number of moduli in base extensions. Standard
base extensions algorithms use 2n moduli ([10], [11], [12],
[13]). Our method only uses 3n2 moduli, reducing data storage
and number of operations for large cryptographic parameters.
Sec. II presents the notations and definitions. Sec. III recalls
state-of-art methods. Sec. IV details our method and some DL
and ECC applications are presented in Sec. V.
II. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
• |X|P is X mod P with P an ℓ-bit prime
• ma,i a w-bit pseudo-Mersenne modulo, ma,i = 2
w−ha,i
with ha,i < 2
⌊w/2⌋ and n = ⌈ℓ/w⌉
• Ba,Bb,Bc 3 coprime RNS bases, with Ba =
(ma,1, . . . ,ma,na) composed of na moduli all ma,i pair-
wise co-primes (similar definitions for Bb and Bc)
•
−−−→
(X)a represents X in the RNS base Ba, abbreviated by−−→
Xa when no confusion is possible, and defined by:
−−−→
(X)a = (xa,1, . . . , xa,na) where xa,i = |X|ma,i (1)
• Ma =
∏na
i=1ma,i, Ta,i =
Ma
ma,i
,
−→
Ta =
(
|Ta,1|ma,1 , . . . , |Ta,na |ma,na
)
• EMM a w-bit elementary modular multiplication (e.g. |xi ·
yi|m), EMW a w-bit elementary memory word (for storage)
• Ba|b = (ma,1, . . . ,ma,na ,mb,1, . . . ,mb,nb) is the con-
catenation of Ba and Bb,
−−−−→
(X)a|b is X in RNS base Ba|b
III. STATE-OF-ART
A. Residue Number System (RNS)
RNS has been proposed in [7], [8] and used in asymmetric
cryptography (see Tab. I). A large integer X , with 0 6 X <
Ma, is converted to a unique RNS representation
−−→
Xa in base
Ba by applying definition at Eqn. (1). The reverse conversion,
from RNS to a standard representation, uses the CRT formula:
X = |X|Ma =
∣∣∣∣∣
na∑
i=1
∣∣xa,i · T−1a,i ∣∣ma,i× Ta,i
∣∣∣∣∣
Ma
.
Addition/subtraction and multiplication are efficient and
simple in RNS (⋄ ∈ {+,−,×}). For instance in base Ba:
−−→
Xa ⋄
−→
Ya =
(
|xa,1 ⋄ ya,1|ma,1 , . . . , |xa,ni ⋄ ya,ni |ma,na
)
.
(2)
Computations modulo ma,j are independent from those
performed on other moduli ma,i with i 6= j, whereas classical
binary representation requires carry propagation. Then, an
RNS multiplication requires na independent EMMs. In base Ba,
exact division by Z can be performed through a multiplication
by
−−−−−→(
Z−1a
)
a
= (|Z−1a |ma,1 , . . . , |Z
−1
a |ma,na ) when Z is co-
prime toMa. All these RNS operations are performed modulo
Ma in base Ba (a consequence of the CRT) and similar
behavior holds for bases Bb and Bc.
But RNS is a non-positional representation, thus compar-
isons, general division and modular reduction are complex and
costly operations in RNS (for instance, see [10]).
reference conference/journal year usage implementation elements sizes and RNS bases (n× w)
[14] CHES 2001 RSA ASIC 250 nm 672, 1024, 2048, 4096
(22× 32), (33× 32), (66× 32), (66× 32 ⋆)
[15] CHES 2008 RSA GPU 8800GTS 1024 (16× 32 ⋆), 2048 (32× 32 ⋆),
ECC 224 (7× 32)
[16] IEEETCAS I 2009 ECC FPGA Virtex E 160, 192, 224, 256
5 bases/FP size, e.g. (30× {23, 28, 30, 35})
[17] CHES 2010 ECC FPGA Stratix 160 (5× 34), 192 (6× 33), 256 (8× 33),
I & II 384 (11× 35), 521 (15× 35)
[18] IEEETC 2012 RSA ASIC 45 nm 1024 (33× 32)
[19] Comp. J. 2012 ECC GPU 285GTX 224 (15× 16)
[20] Arith 2013 RSA ASIC 250 nm 1024 (33× 32), 4096 (65× 64)
[21] IEEETVLSI 2013 ECC FPGA VirtexE 160, 192, 224, 256
Virtex 2 Pro 3× 56, (3× 66 & 4× 50),
Stratix II 4× 58, 4× 66
TABLE I
STATE OF ART ON RNS IN ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY (⋆ DENOTES CRT BASED RSA AND N MEANS NO IMPLEMENTATION RESULT REPORTED).
B. Base Extension
To speed up operations such as RNS modular reduction, the
base extension (BE) has been introduced in [10]. It converts
−−→
Xa from base Ba into
−→
Xb in base Bb without intermediate
conversion to a classical representation. Among state-of-art
BE algorithms [12], [13], [11], we only consider [12] due to
its high level of parallelism (but our idea can be extended to
other methods). BE Algo. 1 approximates the CRT formula
X =
∑na
i=1
(∣∣xa,i · T−1a,i ∣∣ma,i Ta,i
)
− qMa where
q =
 na∑
i=1
∣∣xa,i · T−1a,i ∣∣ma,i
ma,i
 =
⌊
na∑
i=1
ξa,i
ma,i
⌋
.
In BE Algo. 1 from [12], the trunc function approximates
the division ξa,i/ma,i using only a few most significant bits
of ξa,i and 2
w instead of ma,i. The approximation error is
denoted εmax. If Xa < (1 − σ0)Ma with εmax < σ0 then this
approximation has no influence on the result and the output of
Algo. 1 is
−→
Xb . In the other case, σ0 is set to 0 and the output
is either
−→
Xb or
−−−−−−−−→
(X +Ma)b . See [12] for all details regarding
the approximation. This algorithm requires (na nb+na) EMMs.
Algorithm 1: Base extension (BE) from [12]
Input:
−−→
Xa , Ba, Bb, σ0 (fixed as a global parameter)
Precomp.:
−−−−−→(
T−1a
)
a
,
−−−−→
(Ta)b ,
−−−−−−→
(−Ma)b
Output:
−→
Xb
1
−→
ξa =
−−→
Xa ×
−−−−−→(
T−1a
)
a
,
−→
Xb =
−→
0b , σ = σ0
2 for i = 1, . . . , na do
3 σ = σ + trunc(ξa,i)
4 q = ⌊σ⌋ /* Comment: q is 0 or 1 */
5 σ = σ − q
6 for j = 1, . . . , nb do
7 xb,j = |xb,j + ξa,i · Ta,i + q · (−Ma)|mb,j
8 return
−→
Xb
C. RNS Modular Multiplication (RNS-MM)
State-of-art RNS modular multiplication is based on the
Montgomery modular multiplication [22], its RNS adaptation
was initially proposed in [23] and optimized in [24], [12], [18].
Algorithm 2: RNS Montgomery Reduction from [23]
Input: (
−−→
Xa ,
−→
Xb )
Precomp.: (
−→
Pa ,
−→
Pb ),
−−−−−−→
(−P−1)a ,
−−−−−→
(M−1a )b
Output:
−→
S =
−−−−−−−−−−→∣∣X|M−1|P ∣∣P + δ−→P in Ba and Bb
with δ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α− 1}
1
−−→
Qa ←
−−→
Xa ×
−−−−−−→
(−P−1)a
2
−→
Qb ← BE
(−−→
Qa ,Ba,Bb
)
3
−→
Rb ←
−→
Xb +
−→
Qb ×
−→
Pb
4
−→
Sb ←
−→
Rb ×
−−−−−→
(M−1a )b
5
−→
Sa ← BE
(−→
Sb ,Bb,Ba
)
6 return (
−→
Sa ,
−→
Sb )
RNS modular reduction (RNS-MR) Algo. 2 mainly differs
from the standard Montgomery reduction by the use of 2 BEs
to be able to divide by Ba. Usually, both bases have n elements
(na = nb = n). Thus, modular multiplication is computed
using an RNS multiplication followed by a reduction with
Algo. 2. [18] presents optimizations leading to an RNS Mont-
gomery multiplication with 2na nb +2na +2nb = 2n
2 +4n
EMM. The output of RNS-MR is the RNS representation of
S < αP , with α > 3, with α an adjustable parameter to
perform more complex operations (e.g. AB + CD mod P ).
IV. PROPOSED RNS MODULAR MULTIPLICATION
ALGORITHM
The objective of our method is to, in a first time, decompose
the operands into 2 sub-values, and, in a second time, use them
in such a way only 3n/2 moduli are required instead of 2n.
This leads to reduce the number of elementary computations
and/or data storages in some operation patterns. In case of a
square, the splitting step is performed only once. Same thing
applies in case of multiplication by a constant. For instance, in
the Montgomery powering ladder (see [25]), a loop with the
pattern A ← BC,D ← B2 is performed (the decomposition
of B is reused for BC as well as for B2).
Our RNS modular multiplication (named SPRR) is divided
into 3 steps: splitting (Split), partial reduction (PR) and
final reduction (R). Let us assume |XY |P is computed (or
|XYM |P as for Montgomery multiplication). Split performs
a specific decomposition of X and Y into 2 sub-values
(see Sec. IV-A). PR uses these decompositions to compute
a partially reduced value which is finally reduced using
RNS Montgomery modular reduction. The complete SPRR is
detailed at Sec. IV-B.
A. The Splitting Step
In this step, operands X and Y are split into their quo-
tient/remainder by Ma using Algo. 3 such that X = KxMa+
Rx and Y = KyMa+Ry . The first BE (line 1) converts the re-
mainder from Ba to the other bases (we recall
−−→
Xa =
−−−−→
(Rx)a ).
Line 2 computes the quotient in bases Bb and Bc. Finally, the
second BE (line 3) brings back the quotient into the first base
Ba from Bb. Because the output of BE is approximated (see
Sec. III-B), we add small additional constraints on the size of
Mb and Mc (included in Prop. 1, Sec. IV-B).
To convert Kx back to Ba using Algo. 1, the constraints
presented in Sec. III-B have to be respected to ensure an exact
result. Using base Bb at line 3 gives (1− σ0)Mb >
αP
Ma
. The
same type of constraint occurs when Bc is chosen instead of
Bb in a symmetric way.
Algorithm 3: Proposed Splitting Step (Split)
Input:
−−−−→
Xa|b|c , X < αP
Precomp.:
−−−−−−−→(
M−1a
)
b|c
Output:
−−−−−−→
(Kx)a|b|c ,
−−−−−−→
(Rx)a|b|c with
−−−−→
Xa|b|c =
−−−−−−→
(Kx)a|b|c ×
−−−−−−−→
(Ma)a|b|c +
−−−−−−→
(Rx)a|b|c
1
−−−−−→
(Rx)b|c ← BE
(−−−−→
(Rx)a ,Ba,Bb|c
)
2
−−−−−→
(Kx)b|c ←
(−−−→
Xb|c −
−−−−−→
(Rx)b|c
)
×
−−−−−−−→(
M−1a
)
b|c
3
−−−−→
(Kx)a ← BE
(−−−−→
(Kx)b ,Bb,Ba
)
4 return
−−−−−−→
(Kx)a|b|c ,
−−−−−−→
(Rx)a|b|c
The computation performed in base Bb for the multiplication
by
−−−−−−−→(
M−1a
)
b|c
at line 2 of Algo. 3 can be combined with
the one also in base Bb by
−−−−−→(
T−1b
)
b
at line 1 of Algo. 1
(during the second BE at line 3 of Algo. 3). This combination
saves nb EMMs. As indicated in Tab. II,
−−−−−−−−−→(
M−1a T
−1
b
)
b
is then
precomputed.
Thus, the total cost of Split is (na + na(nb + nc)) +
(nb + nbna) + nc EMMs. In the case na = nb = nc = n/2,
this cost is 34n
2 + 32n EMMs.
base extension (BE)computations in 1 base
S
P
L
IT
P
R
M
R
base Ba
Xa Ya
Ua
Kx
Ky
R
y
=
Y
a
R
x
=
X
a
Qa
Sa
base Bb
Xb Yb
Rx
Kx
Ry
Ky
Ub
Qb
Sb
base Bc
Xc Yc
Rx
Kx
Ry
Ky
Uc
Qc
Sc
Fig. 1. Computation flow in our SPRR Algo. 4.
The Split step behaves as the decomposition in Karatsuba
multiplication [26] (leading to 3 sub-products instead of 4
without decomposition). But Karatsuba method cannot be used
in RNS since it is a non-positional representation.
B. SPRR Modular Multiplication Algorithm
Our method is presented in Algo. 4 and illustrated on Fig. 1.
Algorithm 4: Proposed Modular Multiplication (SPRR)
Input:
−−−−→
Xa|b|c ,
−−−→
Ya|b|c , X,Y < αP
Precomp.: D = |M−1a |P
Output:
−−−→
Va|b|c , V ≡
∣∣XYM−1a M−1b ∣∣P , V < αP
1 (
−−−−−−→
(Kx)a|b|c ,
−−−−−−→
(Rx)a|b|c ) ← Split(
−−−−→
Xa,b,c ) ,
(
−−−−−−→
(Ky)a|b|c ,
−−−−−−→
(Ry)a|b|c ) ← Split(
−−−→
Ya,b,c )
2
−−−→
Ua|b|c ←
PR
(−−−−−−→
(Kx)a|b|c ,
−−−−−−→
(Rx)a|b|c ,
−−−−−−→
(Ky)a|b|c ,
−−−−−−→
(Ry)a|b|c , D
)
3
−−−→
Va|b|c ← RNS-MR(
−→
Ub ,
−−→
Ua|c )
4 return
−−−→
Va|b|c
After the decomposition, one has:
|X Y |P =
∣∣KxKyM2a + (KxRy +KyRx)Ma +RxRy∣∣P .
(3)
Hypothesis 1 (H1). D = |M
−1
a |P and Ma have approx-
imately the same size, i.e. ∃µ, with µ small and such that
µP + 1 = Ma ×D.
Under hypothesis H1, we defined U as
U = KxKyMa+(KxRy+KyRx)+RxRyD+αP ≡ |X YD|P .
(4)
If we choose na = n/2 then the sizes of Ma, Rx, Kx and
D are very close to ℓ/2 under H1. One gets log2 U ≈
3
2 log2 P
under H1. More precisely, assuming C(α, µ) =
α2
µ D + 5α+
4µMa, we have:
0 6 U < C(α, µ)P + 4Ma. (5)
This explains why U can be seen as a partially reduced value
of |XYD|P . Then, the computation of U is called partial
reduction (PR). Its cost is the evaluation of U in the 3 bases:
4 multiplications and 2 multiplications by constantsMa and D
in Eqn. 4. Multiplying by Ma in Ba is equivalent to multiply
by 0, then these 6 multiplications in all bases require 4na +
6(nb + nc) = 8n EMMs. This cost can be reduced to 7n EMMs
using Karatsuba’s method [26] on bases Bb and Bc (there is
no impact on the first base):
U = KxKyMa + (KxKy +RxRy − (Kx −Rx)(Ky −Ry))
+RxRyD + αP
= KxKy(Ma + 1) +RxRy(D + 1)
− (Kx −Rx)(Ky −Ry) + αP.
(6)
For the square operation, one multiplication in Ba can
be saved and the cost is 6.5n EMMs. In the operation pat-
tern (XY,XZ), the operations Split(X), Kx(Ma + 1) and
Rx(D+1) are performed only once, then its cost is 4.5n EMMs.
In case of a multiplication by a constant Y , factorizations by
Kx and Rx occur in Eqn. 4, leading to 3n EMMs.
The last step is the final modular reduction of U represented
on 32n moduli using Algo. 2 (where the first base is Bb and
the second one is Ba|c due to the choice of Bb in the Split
see second paragraph of Sec. IV-A, this saves (n2/4)+ (n/2)
words of w-bit precomputations). Its cost is 2nb(na + nc) +
2(na + nc) + nb = n
2 + 52n EMMs. It takes into account some
optimizations from [17], [18].
We have a complete proof for Proposition 1 based on some
inequalities rearrangements. But due to paper length limitation,
we cannot reproduce it here (ask the authors if needed).
Proposition 1 (under H1). P is a large prime, co-prime
with the 3 RNS bases Ba, Bb, Bc; and Mb is selected to
bring back Kx in Ba without approximation error in Split.
If Mb >
1
α−2 (C(α, µ) + 1), Mc >
(α−2)P
Ma
and X,Y < αP
then
−−−→
Va|b|c , the output of Algo. 4, is equal to |XYM
−1
a M
−1
b |P
with V < αP .
This result can be easily adapted to the hypothesis below.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). D = | −M
−1
a |P and Ma have approx-
imately the same size, i.e. ∃µ, with µ small and such that
µP − 1 = Ma ×D.
Under hypothesis H2, we defined U as
U = KxKyMa + (KxRy +KyRx)−RxRyD + (α+Ma)P
≡ |X Y (−D)|P .
The added term MaP ensures U to be non negative. The
only one difference in Prop. 1 using H2 instead of H1 is the
size of Mb, now Mb >
1
α−2 (C(α, µ) +Ma + 1).
As in Montgomery modular multiplication, operands must
be converted into X ′ = |XMaMb|P and Y
′ = |YMaMb|P ,
then SPRR result is |XYMaMb|P under H1 and H2.
C. Parameters Selection
Condition H1 (or H2) is not strictly required in Prop. 1.
But it strongly impacts the size of U and then the total
cost. The condition H1 restricts the choice of parameters in
some cryptosystems. Up to now, we do not have a selection
method to choose a base from a chosen P to satisfy H1.
Then, we cannot choose parameters proposed by NIST for
ECC (which was especially designed to be efficient in the
standard representation, e.g. P521 = 2
521 − 1).
But, one can generate P such as MaD − 1 = µP , with µ
a small integer. In practice, we can select µ = 1, try random
values forD (of size ≈ ℓ/2) and test the primality ofMaD−1.
This method works to generate DL parameters and new P for
ECC, optimized for the use of RNS implementation similarly
to NIST primes for the binary representation.
For the final modular reduction, one can start from any of
the 3 bases. Due to the precomputations savings mentioned
above, base Bb is preferred to Bc and choosing Bb instead of
Ba allows a wider parameter space (starting from Ma limits
the number of couples (α, µ)). Starting from Bb, operands are
represented by |XMaMb|P (the same for Y ) which is the
usual RNS Montgomery representation.
In a very detailed analysis, one can notice that the size
of Mb is longer than the one of Ma of two bits or more
(for µ = 1, α = 3 : Mb > (9D + 4Ma + 12)). These few
additional bits can be easily obtained (e.g. one modulo in Ba
with w − 1 bits and one modulo in Bb with w + 1 bits). This
kind of effect is neglected in the operation count (we assume
multiplications of w, w − 1 and w + 1 bits operands all have
the same cost).
V. APPLICATIONS
The theoretical performances of our method (SPRR)
are compared to state-of-art RNS modular multiplication
(RNS-MM). We analyze the required number of elementary
computations and data storage for both solutions. Only the
number of elementary modular multiplications (w-bit) EMMs
and elementary memory words EMWs are compared. The prod-
uct EMM×EMW is also used as a common global cost metric for
hardware implementation. Operations are directly written in
the Montgomery representation (i.e. |AB|P is in fact |ABM |P
with M = MaMb).
First, basic operations |AB|P , |A
2|P and |cst × A|P cost
2n2 + 4n with RNS-MM (cst is a constant number). Using
SPRR, it costs 52n
2 + 252 n,
7
4n
2 + 212 n and
7
4n
2 + 7n re-
spectively. Using several patterns in one larger sequence of
operations, due to factorizations and reuse, the total cost can
be reduced compared to the sum of the individual ones.
Split
−−−−−−→(
T−1a
)
a
,
−−−−−−→
(Ta,i)b|c ,
−−−−−−→
(Ma)b|c ,
−−−−−−−→(
M−1a
)
c
,
−−−−−−−−−−→(
M−1a T
−1
b
)
b
,
−−−−−→(
Tb,i
)
a
,
−−−−−−→
(−Mb)a : 3n
2/4 + 3n
PR
−−−−→
Da|b|c ,
−−−−→
Pa|b|c : 3n
RNS-MR
−−−−−−−−−−−→(
−P−1T−1
b
)
b
,
−−−−−→(
Tb,i
)
c
,
−−−−−−→
(−Mb)c ,
−−−−−−−−−−−→(
M−1
b
T−1
a|c
)
a|c
,
−−−−−−→(
Ta|c,i
)
b
,
−−−−−−→(
Ma|c
)
b
: 3n2/4 + 5n/2
Total 3n2/2 + 17n/2
TABLE II
MEMORY COUNT DETAILS IN w-BIT WORDS (EMWS)
The total number of precomputed memory words is 32n
2 +
17
2 n for SPRR (see Tab. II), and 2n
2 + 10n for RNS-MM
(from [18]). For large fields, 25% improvement is achieved
due to the reduction from 2n to 3n/2 moduli in the RNS
basis. Moreover, even small RNS bases such as n = 5 lead to
20% memory reduction.
A. Discrete Logarithm in RNS
Exponentiations in FP are common in cryptography such as
in Diffie-Hellman [5] and Elgamal [6] cryptosystems. Both are
based on the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields [27].
P is a 1024–3072 bits prime with P − 1 = V Q and Q a
160–256 bits prime. In fact this condition corresponds to H2,
choosing µ = 1 and D as a multiple of Q: P − 1 = MaD =
MaV
′Q = V Q. Thus P can be generated under H2 and be
used for DL. Exponentiations of G are then computed with G
a generator of the subgroup of order Q of F∗p.
Fig. 2 presents the results for both Montgomery ladder [25]
and least significant bit first (LSBF) exponentiation algo-
rithms. For this type of application, our method speeds up
the computation (EMM) and reduces the global implementation
cost (EMM × EMW). For instance, for the Montgomery ladder,
there is a computation cost of 3.5n2 + 19n EMMs for SPRR
against 4n2 + 8n EMMs for RNS-MM. Moreover, the product
EMM×EMW gives 5.25n4+58.25n3+161.5n2 for SPRR against
8n4+56n3+80n2 for RNS-MM. Common sizes of 1024 and
2048 bits correspond to 33 and 66 moduli (see Tab. I), and
lead to 4% and 9% number of EMMs reduction respectively,
and up to 30% reduction of the global cost.
B. Elliptic Curve Cryptography Formulas in RNS
The second application uses SPRR on ECC. We compare
SPRR and RNS-MM costs for a set of fast formulas from
the explicit formulas database [28] with the usual parameters
short Weierstrass form and Jacobian coordinates, for details
see [2]. Formulas are given for the point doubling, tripling
and mixed addition (point addition with a precomputed point
with Z = 1). The detailed results are in Tab. III.
These results are graphically illustrated in Fig. 3 where
mADD stands for point mixed-addition, DBL doubling and
TPL tripling. The bottom sub-figure corresponds to individual
curve level operations (DBL, TPL, mADD). SPRR is more
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Fig. 2. Theoretical performance and cost comparison of SPRR and RNS-MM
algorithms for LSBF and Montgomery ladder exponentiations.
interesting when operands are reused several times, this is why
the gain is more important on DBL and TPL formulas than
mADD. As an example, in doubling formulas a Split step is
applied on Y1 and Z1 and then can be used to compute Y
2
1 ,
Z21 and (Y1+Z1)
2 (lines 2, 4 and 10 respectively in Tab. III).
We selected 2 common curve level patterns: 2DBL+mADD
and TPL+2DBL+mADD for scalar multiplication. The top
sub-figure shows that considering the global cost (EMM×EMW),
our method is more efficient for n > 5. For bases with n > 16,
one obtain more than 25% global cost improvement using our
method. Moreover, SPRR requires less EMMs than RNS-MM
with n > 16. For instance, for the binary scalar multiplication,
it leads to 4.5% and 9.5% of reduction for n = 20 and
n = 34, respectively (for GPU implementations with w = 16
for instance, see [19]).
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Fig. 3. Theoretical performance and cost comparison of SPRR and RNS-MM
algorithms for various ECC formulas.
VI. CONCLUSION
A new RNS modular multiplication algorithm has been
proposed. Thanks to a specific decomposition of the operands,
some internal computations are shared and only use 3n/2
moduli instead of 2n for standard methods. Memory require-
ments are reduced from 20% to 25% for some asymmetric
cryptographic applications. For ECC and DH applications, the
Point operation P1 + P2 (mixed addition) 2 P1 3 P1
A1 = Z
2
1
, U2 = X2A1, S2 = Y2Z1A1 A = X
2
1
, B = Y 2
1
, C = B2 A = X2
1
, B = Y 2
1
, C = Z2
1
H = U2 −X1, H2 = H
2, I = 4H2 D = Z
2
1
, S = 2
(
(X1 + B)
2 − A− C
)
D = B2, M = 3A+ aC2, N = M2
Formulas J = HI , R = 2(S2 − Y1), V = X1I M = 3A+ aD
2, T = M2 − 2S E = 6
(
(X1 + B)
2 − A−D
)
−N
X3 = R
2 − J − 2V X3 = T F = E
2, T = 16D
Y3 = R(V −X3)− 2Y1J Y3 = M(S − T )− 8C U = (M + E)
2 −N − F − T
Z3 = (Z1 +H)
2 − A1 −H2 Z3 = (Y1 + Z1)
2 − B −D X3 = 4(X1F − 4BU)
Y3 = 8Y1 (U(T − U)− EF )
Z3 = (Z1 + E)
2 − C − F
RNS-MM [EMM] 20n2 + 50n 20n2 + 48n 28n2 + 72n
SPRR [EMM] 17.5n2 + 95n 16n2 + 100.5n 23n2 + 160n
RNS-MM [EMM× EMW] 40n4 + 300n3 + 500n2 40n4 + 296n3 + 480n2 56n4 + 424n3 + 720n2
SPRR [EMM× EMW] 26.25n4 + 291.25n3 + 807.5n2 24n4 + 286.75n3 + 854.25n2 34.5n4 + 435.5n3 + 1360n2
TABLE III
FORMULAS FROM [28] (SHORT WEIERSTRASS, JACOBIAN COORDINATES).
number of operations can be reduced up to 10%. Hence, the
total cost of an implementation using our algorithm is expected
to be better than state-of-art solution for large field appli-
cations. Future prospects include more advanced parameters
selection and full hardware implementation.
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